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Abstract 
Researcher: Brittnee Nicholle Branham 
Title: Analysis of Fatal General Aviation Accidents Occurring From Loss of 
Control on Approach and Landing 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2013 
According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), loss of control in-flight 
is the greatest cause of general aviation accidents.  The purpose of this study was to 
determine the most frequently occurring probable causes and contributing factors from 
loss of control in-flight.  This study used the Pareto principle and methodology developed 
by the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee to analyze accidents retrieved from the 
NTSB’s Aviation Accident Database.  The results showed that 73% of the accidents 
contained the contributing factor of “PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed” across the 
three categories of reciprocating engine aircraft, turbine engine aircraft, and 
experimental-amateur built (E-AB) aircraft.  The results also showed that 50% of all the 
accidents resulted from a pairing of “Pilot-Failure to maintain airspeed” and “PILOT – 
Aerodynamic stall/spin.”  Hypothesis testing showed very few statistically significant 
differences among the three aircraft categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB).  The study 
concluded that resources should be allocated towards finding a solution for pilots’ failure 
to maintain airspeed.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Although aviation safety has largely shifted to a proactive approach to preventing 
accidents, a need still exists to analyze accident trends as a means to improve safety.  
Through analysis of aircraft accident data, trends become apparent and changes can be 
made to current operations to decrease fatality percentages.  According to the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (2012), “General Aviation (GA) has the highest 
aviation accident rate within civil aviation” (p. 1).  
The GA Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), formed as a safety initiative of the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was created to analyze GA accidents to provide 
suggestions and recommendations for GA safety improvements in order to decrease the 
fatality rates (Stephens, 2012).  According to the FAA (2012), loss of control in-flight 
(LOC-I) “continues to be the leading cause accounting for about 70% of all fatal GA 
accidents” (para. 1).  The high occurrence of LOC-I accidents has caught the attention of 
the aviation community; thus, the GAJSC chose to focus its efforts on LOC-I accidents. 
By means of Pareto analysis, the GAJSC was able to identify the most 
frequently occurring phases of flight in which LOC-I led to a fatality (shown in 
Figure 1).   From the Pareto analysis, the GAJSC decided that the first area to 
focus on in the LOC-I category would be the Approach and Landing (A&L) phase 
of flight (GAJSC, 2012).   
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Figure 1.  Loss of Control – Inflight (LOC-I) events by flight phase 2001- 2010.  
Adapted from Pilot-in-command: Avoiding Loss of Control Accidents by Stowell, 2012. 
 
 
 
The GAJSC analyzed a random sample of fatal GA accidents in the LOC-I 
category that occurred during A&L between the years 2001-2010.  From the 
GAJSC’s sample, each accident was coded from a list of Standard Problem 
Statements (SPSs).  Each SPS was assigned a number for statistical purposes.  
After the accident event sequence for each accident had been classified, the 
GAJSC then decided upon detailed implementation plans (DIPs) which were then 
converted to recommendations on how to improve GA safety; these 
recommendations were provided to the FAA. 
Significance of the Study 
According to the NTSB, GA has the highest accident rate in all of civil aviation.  
The NTSB’s (2012) Improve General Aviation Safety webpage states that the rate of GA 
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accidents is “6 times higher than for small commuter operators and 40 times higher than 
for transport category operations” (para 4).  The NTSB (2012) also states that:  
Although the overall general aviation accident rate has remained relatively 
steady at an average of 6.8 per 100,000 flight hours, the components of 
that figure have changed dramatically over the last 10 years. In particular, 
personal flying accident rates have increased 20%, while the fatal accident 
rate has increased 25% over the same 10-year period. The NTSB sees this 
statistic play out frequently, having investigated an average of 1,500 
general aviation accidents each year, in which more than 400 pilots and 
passengers are killed annually.  (para. 4) 
Resources limit the aviation community’s ability to conduct a study that attempts 
to pinpoint areas where change is needed.  It may be hard to find the necessary resources 
to fund both a study and also implement the recommended changes; therefore, it is 
imperative that these resources be allocated wisely when trying to address problems.   
This study aims to use the Pareto principle to determine the hierarchy of probable 
causes and contributing factors to fatal LOC-I during A&L accidents between the years 
2001-2010.  The Pareto principle will identify the most frequently occurring SPSs in the 
sample, thus dividing the vital few and trivial many, and will allow the aviation 
community to focus most of its efforts on the biggest problems.   
Statement of the Problem 
LOC-I has been the leading cause of fatalities in GA for over a decade (GAJSC, 
2012).  Analyzing the accidents to determine probable causes and contributing factors 
enables researchers to identify the most significant areas that must be addressed to reduce 
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the number of GA fatalities.  Researchers do not have a sufficient understanding of the 
probable causes and contributing factors that occur in categories of reciprocating engine 
aircraft (Recip), turbine engine aircraft (Turbine), and experimental-amateur built aircraft 
(E-AB) to make sound decisions about where to invest time and resources to mitigate GA 
fatalities.  The problem identified for this study was to determine which of those probable 
causes and contributing factors occurred in the categories of Recip, Turbine, and E-AB 
within fatal GA accidents from LOC-I during A&L between the years 2001-2010.  
Armed with this information and using the Pareto principle, the causes of LOC-I 
accidents in GA can be identified and time and resources can be spent on the most 
frequently occurring factors to begin mitigating GA fatalities.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the outputs, or assignments of Standard 
Problem Statemens (SPSs), of a sampling process as recommended by Krejcie and 
Morgan (1970) using only the NTSB’s probable cause reports (NTSB, 2013a).  This 
study paralleled a study conducted by the GAJSC, with the exception that this study 
analyzed only the probable cause report whereas the GAJSC analyzed the entire aircraft 
accident report.  This study also differed from the GAJSC study in sampling 
methodology, in that this study used a formula to calculate the minimum sample size 
required and generated a random selection for each of the three categories accordingly, 
whereas the GAJSC selected a random sample of 30 accidents in each category. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study analyzed four research questions and two hypotheses:  
R1: What will be the highest occurring SPSs for fatal aircraft accidents between 
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2001-2010 resulting from LOC-I during A&L? 
R2: What will be the highest occurring SPSs in each of the three categories  
(Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) for fatal aircraft accidents between 2001-2010  
resulting from LOC-I during A&L? 
R3: Will there be any observed pairs of SPSs for fatal aircraft accidents between  
2001-2010 resulting from LOC-I during A&L? 
R4: Will there be any observed pairs of SPSs in each of the three categories  
(Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) for fatal aircraft accidents between 2001-2010  
resulting from LOC-I during A&L? 
H1.  There will be a difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three  
Categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents 
occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010. 
H2.  There will be no difference in the rankings of SPSs among the three  
categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents 
occurring from LOC-I during A&L between  2001-2010. 
Delimitations 
For this study, the full dataset used by the GAJSC was obtained.  The dataset 
contained all filed NTSB fatal GA LOC-I accidents occurring between 2001-2010.  To 
parallel the GAJSC study, only accidents that occurred during the A&L phase of flight 
were used.  Therefore, the criteria for selection were: 
• General Aviation 
• Accidents that occurred between 2001-2010 
• Primary Cause: Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I) 
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• During the Approach and Landing (A&L) phase of flight 
The GAJSC chose to further sort its selections into three aircraft categories: 
Recip, Turbine, and E-AB.  The present study also utilized these three categories. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
Limitations of this study were restricted resources (time, money, and subject 
matter experts) to analyze adequately all of the accidents and produce the outputs (SPS 
assignments).  To parallel the GAJSC study, the same group members should have 
analyzed the accidents in the newly constructed samples, which could have outputs that 
are more comparable.  To overcome this limitation, the researcher worked with a highly 
experienced collaborator.  The researcher and collaborator performed consensus-based 
analyses and ratings.  It was assumed that the researcher and collaborator used rationale 
similar to that of the GAJSC’s when determining the SPSs for each accident. 
In addition, the researcher and collaborator did not possess the credentials either 
to analyze aircraft accidents or to determine intervention strategies and recommendations 
similar to those of the GAJSC.  Therefore, the researcher and collaborator did not 
replicate the entire GAJSC study.  This study aimed to assign SPSs from the NTSB’s 
(2013a) probable cause reports.  
Furthermore, the list of SPSs that the GAJSC developed was an evolving list 
during its study.  Therefore, the present study was able to use the completed list, whereas 
the GAJSC only had a partial list in the early stages of its accident investigation.  Also, 
the GAJSC did not go back through its LOC-I A&L study to update for newly-developed 
SPSs. Consequently, the results of the assigned SPSs for this study may be skewed from 
the GAJSC’s study.   
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An additional limitation was the ability of the researcher to obtain full accident 
reports from the NTSB (2013a) accident database, as not all reports are readily available 
online and some must be requested from the NTSB.  Therefore, for this study, the 
researcher analyzed only the probable cause reports stored online on the NTSB’s (2013a) 
accident database.  
Assumptions of this study were that the NTSB’s (2013a) accident database is 
valid and that the NTSB accurately investigated each accident and listed the necessary 
details of each accident and its probable cause and contributing factors in the accident’s 
probable cause report.  This study also assumes that the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) 
sample size equation is a valid equation for selecting sample sizes from a population. 
Definitions of Terms 
Approach for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR):  “From the Initial Approach Fix 
(IAF) to the beginning of the landing flare” (NTSB, 2011, p. 57). 
Approach for Visual Flight Rules (VFR):  “From the point of VFR pattern entry,  
or 1,000 feet above the runway elevation, to the beginning of the 
landing flare” (NTSB, 2011, p. 57). 
General Aviation:  “Any civil aircraft operation that is not covered by 14 CFR 
Parts 121 or 135 (or Part 129, which applies to foreign air 
carriers)” (NTSB, 2011, p. 5). 
Landing:  “From the beginning of the landing flare until the aircraft exits the  
landing runway, comes to a stop on the runway, or when power is 
applied for takeoff in the case of a touch-and-go landing” (NTSB, 
2011, p. 57).  
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Loss of Control In-Flight:  “Significant, unintended departure of the aircraft from   
controlled flight, the operational flight envelope, or usual flight 
attitudes” (Jacobson, 2010, slide 4). 
List of Acronyms 
A&L  Approach and Landing  
AOPA  Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
CAST  Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
CGAR  Center of Excellence for General Aviation Research 
CICTT  CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team 
DIPs  Detailed Implementation Plans 
EAA  Experimental Aircraft Association 
E-AB  Experimental-Amateur Built 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FOIA  Freedom of Information Act 
GA  General Aviation 
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee 
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
HAI  Helicopter Association International 
IAF  Initial Approach Fix 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR  Instrument Flight Rules 
JIMDAT Joint Implementation Monitoring Data Analysis Team 
JSAT  Joint Safety Analysis Team 
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JSIT  Joint Safety Implementation Team 
LOC-I  Loss of Control In-flight 
LOCWG Loss of Control Working Group 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATA  National Air Transportation Association 
NBAA  National Business Aviation Association 
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board 
NWS  National Weather Service 
SAMA  Small Aircraft Manufacturers Association 
SAT  Safety Analysis Team 
SE  Standard Error 
SEs  Safety Enhancements 
SPSs  Standard Problem Statements 
SPSS  Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
VFR  Visual Flight Rules 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
LOC-I has consistently been the leading cause of GA fatalities over the last 
decade (2001-2010), resulting in 1,259 fatal accidents (GAJSC, 2012).  The FAA 
established the GAJSC under the Safer Skies initiative in an effort to mitigate the rate of 
fatalities in GA accidents (GAJSC, 2012).  Recent efforts of the GAJSC have focused on 
LOC-I and its sub-categories such as A&L, maneuvering, enroute, takeoff, etc.  This 
study will focus only on the GAJSC’s LOC-I A&L study. 
Loss of Control In-Flight 
According to the FAA (2012), LOC-I “continues to be the leading cause 
accounting for about 70% of all fatal GA accidents” (para. 1).  Figure 2 shows the 
number of GA fatal accidents by the top five Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
(CAST)/International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Common Taxonomy Team 
(CICTT) occurrences.  CICTT is a team of aviation industry leaders from around the 
world that works towards developing common taxonomies and definitions for the 
purposes of standardizing accident and incident reporting (Fattah & Stephens, n.d.).  In 
Figure 2, there are three times as many LOC-I fatal accidents than any other CICTT 
occurrence category.  The high occurrence of LOC-I accidents is of significant concern 
for the aviation community, and this is where the GAJSC chose to focus.  
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Figure 2.  GA fatal accidents occurring between 2001-2010 by top ten CICTT occurrence 
categories.  Adapted from Washington’s Likely Impact on the Future of General Aviation 
and Flight Training by Bunce, 2012. 
 
 
 
Jacobson (2010), the Loss of Control Study Team Lead at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center, 
presented two definitions for LOC-I.  The first definition, provided by a CAST report, 
includes a “significant, unintended departure of the aircraft from controlled flight, the 
operational flight envelope, or usual flight attitudes…”  (as cited in Jacobson, 2010, slide 
four).  However, Jacobson (2010) also reported that an Airplane Upset Recovery Training 
Aid defined LOC-I through general unintentional conditions that describe an airplane 
upset using measurable characteristics: 
• Pitch attitude greater than 25 degrees nose up 
• Pitch attitude greater than 10 degrees nose down 
• Bank angle greater than 45 degrees 
• Within the above parameters, but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for 
the conditions (slide 5). 
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 Belcastro and Foster (2010) stated that the difficulty in understanding LOC-I is 
the dynamic nature in which aircraft accidents occurred.  Aircraft accidents often 
occurred after a culmination of events rather than from a single causal factor.  Without 
one causal factor, one single solution does not exist.  Therefore, a need exists to analyze 
each individual LOC-I accident to understand properly all of the underlying conditions 
present.  Mitigating LOC-I accidents necessitates quantifying qualitative data (i.e., 
creating a type of system to numerically quantify an accident narrative).  Belcastro and 
Foster’s (2010) study analyzed accident report narratives and each accident’s contributing 
factors were categorized into three categories: adverse onboard conditions, external 
hazards and disturbances, and vehicle upsets (p. 3). This method allowed researchers and 
aircraft safety analysts to identify the most frequently occurring contributing factors and 
to determine a proper implementation strategy for the reduction of LOC-I fatalities 
(Belcastro & Foster, 2010). 
CAST 
It is important to review the CAST and its research methodology, as CAST 
provided the methodological foundation for the GAJSC, and ultimately, this study.  
According to the CAST (2011) website, CAST was formed by the FAA in 1998 
following two government reports on aviation safety: The White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security Report and The National Civil Aviation Commission Review.  
CAST’s first goal was to reduce the number of fatalities in commercial aviation by 80% 
by the year 2008.  In addition, CAST claims that “the work of the Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team (CAST), along with new aircraft, regulations and other activities, reduced 
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the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the United States by 83% from 1998 to 2008” 
(Duquette, 2011, p. 1). 
Additionally, the CAST Fact Sheet stated that the group determines which 
accident and incident trends justify immediate action through a detailed analysis process 
(Duquette, 2011).  Duquette (2011) detailed the CAST analysis process: 
CAST has reduced the risk in commercial aviation by focusing on 
controlled flight into terrain, A&L accidents, loss of control, weather, 
turbulence, [and much more by using] a disciplined, data driven, and 
focused approach of:  
• analysis of past accidents/incidents;  
• identification of accident precursors; 
• development of specific safety enhancements to address precursors 
and contributing factors; 
• implementation of cost effective safety enhancements; 
• tracking implementation for effectiveness; and 
• using knowledge gained to continually improve the aviation 
system.  (para. 7) 
CAST categorizes each accident into standard problem statements (SPSs); 
examples can be found in Appendix A.  Once each accident has been classified with its 
proper SPS, the group then analyzes the reoccurring theme (e.g., improper use of 
standard radio phraseology) and determines an appropriate Safety Enhancement to 
recommend to the FAA and aviation community (CAST, 2011).  
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 CAST is split into three working groups: Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT), 
Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT), and Joint Implementation Monitoring Data 
Analysis Team (JIMDAT). These working groups allow the CAST to divide the tasks 
into data analysis, safety enhancement development, and development of master safety 
plans which measure effectiveness and identify future areas to study (Duquette, 2011). 
CAST is composed of many top aviation industry officials from organizations such as: 
Aerospace Industries Association, Airbus, Airports Council International, Air Transport 
Association, The Boeing Company, Flight Safety Foundation, General Electric 
(representing all engine manufacturers), National Air Carrier Association, Regional 
Airline Association, and many more (Duquette, 2011).  
GAJSC 
 In the mid-1990s, the GAJSC was formed and modeled after the CAST.  The 
GAJSC and its CAST counterparts are shown in Figure 3.  Though the GAJSC was 
formed in the mid-1990s, interest in the committee declined and the committee became 
inactive.  However, through a series of years that indicated a large increase in fatalities 
for GA, the FAA reestablished the committee.  
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Figure 3.  Comparison of the CAST and GAJSC working groups.  Adapted from The GA 
JSC SAT and Working Group Processes by C. Stephens, 2012. 
 
 
According to the GAJSC Charter, the committee “is the primary vehicle for 
government-industry cooperation, communication, and coordination on GA accident 
mitigation” (FAA, 2006, p. 1).  The GAJSC includes members from many prominent 
aviation entities including the FAA, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), 
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
(GAMA), Helicopter Association International (HAI), National Air Transportation 
Association (NATA), National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), National Weather Service (NWS), and Small 
Aircraft Manufacturers Association (SAMA) (FAA, 2006).  
 According to the FAA (2006), the GAJSC is a means to reduce GA accident 
fatalities through detailed analysis of GA accident/incident trends that govern the areas of 
emphasis for the GAJSC as well as the FAA and, thus, sharing their findings with the GA 
community. When reinstated by the FAA in 2011, the GAJSC focused its first study on 
determining the primary cause for GA fatal accidents (GAJSC, 2012).  The results 
showed that LOC-I was the leading cause for GA fatalities (FAA, 2011).  As a result, the 
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committee decided to analyze LOC-I accidents by flight phase categories: maneuvering, 
approach, enroute, initial climb, takeoff, uncontrolled descent, landing, and others (FAA, 
2011).  Though maneuvering was the leading phase for LOC-I accidents, the GAJSC 
decided to focus on LOC during the approach and landing phase of flight because of its 
applicability to the three main GA communities of Recip, Turbine, and E-AB aircraft 
(GAJSC, 2012).  
The GAJSC LOC-I A&L final report.  The GAJSC compiled the fatal GA 
accidents between the years 2001-2010 that resulted from LOC-I during A&L.  The 
accident dataset contained 1,259 LOC-I accidents.  When the committee narrowed down 
the dataset to show only LOC-I accidents occurring during A&L, the population was 
reduced to 279.  The GAJSC stratified the population into three sub-categories: 
reciprocating engine aircraft, turbine aircraft, and E-AB aircraft. 
The GAJSC developed a sampling methodology for accident selection. According 
to the GAJSC’s final report (2013): 
If the resultant search query from the NTSB's database exceeds thirty (30) 
separate accident reports, a random sample of the available reports will be 
collected.  The random sample shall include a minimum of thirty (30) samples.  If 
thirty (30) reports are not available, Non-Fatal accidents may be used to bring the 
total sample size to thirty (30).  In addition, the SAT may decide that a separate 
and additional sample involving Amateur Built aircraft be utilized. 
A software tool, such as Microsoft's Excel or IBM's SPSS, will be used to 
randomize and select the sample.  The randomizing shall only use the NTSB 
report number, and once run, shall constitute the master list of accident reports 
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that will be used for analysis.  Further information within the accident report will 
be accessed only after the master list is compiled. (p. A4-2) 
Due to restrictions of time and resources, the GAJSC selected 60 accidents for 
turbine engine, 60 accidents for reciprocating engine aircraft, and 60 accidents for aircraft 
in the E-AB category (GAJSC, 2012).  However, only “the first 30 well documented 
accidents from this list were analyzed in detail” (GAJSC, 2012).  When the random 
samples were established, the committee analyzed each of the 90 accidents and 
categorized the event sequence by issuing SPSs (see Appendix A for a full list of SPSs). 
The GAJSC’s methodology for the A&L study (2012) states that:  
Three subteams of the LOCWG membership (reciprocating non E-AB, 
experimental amateur built, and turbine) were assigned a set of 30 accident 
reports to analyze.  Each subteam developed an event sequence spreadsheet…  
Each spreadsheet included the events necessary to provide context for 
understanding the nature of the accident sequence.  The subteams then evaluated 
the events to determine if they represented a “problem” involving 
hardware/software failure or human execution errors, decisions, or procedural 
non-compliance. 
If the subteam members considered an event was contributory to the accident, 
they developed a statement describing why it contributed to the accident.  They 
identified the specific nature of the problem associated with an event in the 
sequence along with the factors that could have precipitated the problem.  These 
contributing factors were then restated in more general terms as standard problem 
statements to make them relevant beyond the specific accident.  (p. 6) 
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 According to the GAJSC (2012) Loss of Control Work Group Approach and 
Landing report, the GAJSC developed a rating scale for the SPSs along with potential 
interventions for each problem.  After all of the accidents had been categorized by SPSs, 
the GAJSC then identified intervention strategies and rated the anticipated effectiveness 
of each intervention strategy.  These interventions were then used to develop a set of 
Safety Enhancements (SEs) (Stephens, 2012).  
After the development of the SEs was completed, the GAJSC then “developed 
mitigations based on problems found and built Detailed Implementation Plans (DIPs)” 
(Fazio, 2012, p. 8).  The intended DIP’s process is to detail mitigations and the steps 
towards implementations that are evaluated on resources and benefits (Fazio, 2012).  
NTSB Aviation Accident Reporting 
 According to the NTSB website (2013b):  
The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with 
investigating every civil aviation accident in the U.S. and significant accidents in 
other modes of transportation-railroad, highway, marine and pipeline.  The NTSB 
determines the probable cause of each accident investigated and issues safety 
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents.  (para. 2) 
The NTSB does not have regulatory power to make changes within the 
transportation industry; the NTSB can only provide recommendations for changes 
(NTSB, 2013c).  According to the NTSB (2013c) website, The NTSB’s “effectiveness 
depends on [its] reputation for conducting thorough, accurate, and independent 
investigations and for producing timely, well-considered recommendations to enhance 
transportation safety” (para. 7).  
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The final product of an NTSB accident investigation is the accident final report.  
According to the NTSB (2013d) Accident Report website:  
Accident Reports are one of the main products of an NTSB investigation.  Reports 
provide details about the accident, analysis of the factual data, conclusions and the 
probable cause of the accident, and the related safety recommendations.  Most 
reports focus on a single accident, though the NTSB also produces reports 
addressing issues common to a set of similar accidents.  (para. 1) 
According to the NTSB (2013e), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),  
Any person has a right, enforceable in court, to obtain access to federal agency 
records, except to the extent that such records (or portions of them) are protected 
from public disclosure by one of nine exemptions or by one of three special law 
enforcement record exclusions.  (para. 1) 
Due to the FOIA, “the NTSB has been proactively posting public docket 
information on the accidents and incidents investigated by the Safety Board… since July 
1, 2009” (NTSB, 2013e, para. 7).  Furthermore, the NTSB (2013a) states:  
The NTSB aviation accident database contains information from 1962 and later 
about civil aviation accidents and selected incidents within the United States, its 
territories and possessions, and in international waters.  Generally, 
a preliminary report is available online within a few days of an accident.  
Factual information is added when available, and when the investigation is 
completed, the preliminary report is replaced with a final description of the 
accident and its probable cause.  Full narrative descriptions may not be available 
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for dates before 1993, cases under revision, or where NTSB did not have primary 
investigative responsibility.  (para. 1) 
Sampling 
 Ravid (2011) defines a sample as a small, yet representable portion that can be 
used to make inferences about a population as a whole.  Without a correct sample size, 
predictions about the population as a whole become distorted and inaccurate.  The 
generic term for the predictions about the population as whole is called generalizability 
(Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011).  Remler and Van Ryzin (2011) explained that 
generalizability could also be referred to as external validity.  The external validity 
“illustrates the concept of...projecting the results of one study to a much larger reality” 
(Remler &Van Ryzin, 2011, p. 140).  
Furthermore, Remler and Van Ryzin (2011) stated that during statistical tests, 
researchers try to analyze the significance of a statement about a population.  This 
statement is referred to as a null hypothesis.  The null hypothesis is a claim made about a 
population being observed and is usually stated as “there is no difference” (p. 273).  
When running statistical tests, the results will either cause the researcher to fail to reject 
the null hypothesis, meaning there is no statistically significant difference, or reject the 
null hypothesis, indicating that a statistically significant difference does exist.  
Moreover, errors can be made in hypotheses testing when a researcher rejects the 
null hypothesis by claiming a difference exists when there is none (Type I error) or when 
the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis by failing to recognize a difference (Type 
II error) (Banerjee, Chitnis, Jadhav, Bhawalkar, & Chaudhury, 2009).  To reduce the 
chance of committing a Type I or Type II error, a greater sample size should be selected 
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(i.e., larger samples mean that there is less chance that a given sample is significantly 
different from the population) (Banerjee et al., 2009). 
Determining sample size.  In Practical Sampling by Henry (1990), “sample size 
it the most potent method of achieving estimates that are sufficiently precise and reliable 
for policy decisions or scientific study” (p. 117).  Henry also added that as the sample 
size increases, the standard error (SE) decreases; also, when determining sample size 
…the tolerable error of the estimates or power of the analysis must be 
made.  The determination of tolerable error or power needs for a policy 
study tends to be defined more by the use for the information in the 
particular situation at hand than by conventional standards.  (p. 117) 
Henry (1990) continued that, though increasing the sample size does reduce error, 
larger samples could also increase the resources (such as time and money) that are needed 
for the study (p. 117).  Similarly, Good and Hardin (2006) indicated that 
 …to determine the optimal sample size for testing a hypothesis, [the following 
must be specified]:  
• Desired power and significance level 
• Distributions of the observables 
• Statistical test(s) that will be employed 
• Whether each comparison is formulated as a one-tailed or a two-tailed test.  
(p. 31) 
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Further, Good and Hardin (2006) stated that 
 …to determine the optimal sample size for providing a confidence interval, [the 
following must be specified]:  
• Desired level of confidence 
• Desired width of the interval 
• Distributions of the observables.  (p. 31) 
Random sampling.  A random sample, explained by Polonsky and Waller 
(2011), “is a sampling procedure in which each element of the population has the same 
probabilistic chance of being selected for the sample” (p. 140).  Stratified sampling, 
where the population is divided into subgroups (Polonsky & Waller, 2011), was used by 
the GAJSC to sub-divide the population into the three subgroups as mentioned earlier 
(GAJSC, 2012).  Polonsky and Waller (2011) also provide a list of strengths and 
weaknesses for each sampling method (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Strengths and Weaknesses for Random and Stratified Sampling 
Technique Strengths Weaknesses 
Random Sampling Easily understood  
Results are projectable 
Difficult to construct sampling 
frame,  
Expensive,  
Lower precision 
No assurance of 
representativeness 
Stratified Sampling Precise  
Includes all important sub-
populations 
Difficult to select relevant 
stratification variables,  
Not feasible to stratify on many 
variables,  
Expensive 
Note.  Adapted from Designing and Managing a Research Project by M. J. Polonsky and 
D. S. Waller, 2011, p. 141. 
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Krejcie and Morgan (1970) offer the following equation (referred to as 
Equation 1) for easily determining an appropriate sample size:  
 
𝑠 =  𝑋2 × 𝑁 × 𝑃(1 − 𝑃)(𝑑2(𝑁 − 1)) + (𝑋2 × 𝑃(1 − 𝑃)) (1) 
 
Where:  
 s = required sample size. 
X2 = the table value of Chi-square for one degree of freedom at the desired 
confidence level (3.841). 
N = the population size. 
P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the 
maximum sample size). 
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05) 
Chuan (2006) compared sample sizes, calculated using Equation 1, and the Cohen 
Statistical Power Analysis.  In Cohen’s (1992) A Power Primer, he explains that, 
“Statistical power analysis exploits the relationships among the four variables involved in 
statistical inference: sample size (N), significance criterion (α), population effect size 
(ES), and statistical power” (p. 156). Cohen elaborated that in research studies, it is 
sometimes more beneficial to determine the sample size by using predetermined levels of 
significance, effect size, and power.  Furthermore, Chuan (2006) reported that four 
factors determine sample size: “(1) how much sampling error can be tolerated; (2) 
population size; (3) how varied the population is with respect to the characteristics of 
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interest; and (4) the smallest subgroup within the sample for which estimates are needed” 
(p. 79).  Cohen (as cited in Chuan, 2006) determined that the following were acceptable 
levels for research: a significance level (alpha or α) set at .05, a medium effect size of .30 
for product-moment analysis (Pearson’s Correlation), a medium effect size of .15 for 
regression analysis, and desired power of .80 (β = .20).  Chuan (2006) was able to 
conclude that, for a population of 500, Equation 1 yielded a sample size of 217.  
However, Cohen’s Statistical Power Analysis resulted in 85 samples for a correlational 
study and 116 samples for a regression study.  Chuan (2006) justified using a range of 
85-116 (depending on the type of statistical test: correlation or regression) as suggested 
by Cohen’s Statistical Power Analysis by stating:  
First, Cohen is not only concerned about the magnitude with regards to the 
statistical test results and its accompanying ρ value (as most researchers are) but 
also the existence of the phenomenon understudied by considering additional 
factors such as population effect size and the statistical power.  In most research, 
significance testing is heavily preferred to confidence interval estimation (Cohen, 
1992).  They failed to consider the importance of effect size and the statistical 
power, which has been established in the preceding section.  (p. 84) 
 Chuan (2006) suggests that reasons for opting for the smaller sample size 
determined by Cohen’s Statistical Power Analysis versus the larger size determined by 
Equation 1 would be based on the researcher's time, resources, and money required for 
the experiment.  Sometimes these extraneous factors do influence the sample size that can 
be handled by the researcher.  It is up to the researcher to determine the ‘middle ground’ 
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in order to conduct and follow proper research methodology while using the minimal 
amount of resources required (Chuan, 2006). 
Pareto’s Principle (80/20 Rule) 
 Pareto’s principle is used to conduct a Pareto analysis.  According to Ziarati 
(2006), Pareto analysis “is based on the proven Pareto principle that 20% of sources 
cause 80% of the problems” (p. 2).  Using Pareto analysis techniques can help determine 
the factors that can produce the greatest results if remedied (p. 2).  
 Juran (1954) advanced the Pareto principle and its universal applications.  Juran 
coined the terms “vital few and trivial many” as they apply to the principle.  Juran (1954) 
states that, “the practical expression of this principle is the preparation of a written list of 
the problems in order of their importance = the types of accidents in order of frequency, 
the types of defects in order of amount of loss caused, the elements of cost in order of 
amount, etc.”  (p. 3).  Juran explains that, “the written list automatically shows the ‘vital 
few’ at the head of the list; the ‘trivial many’ are at the foot of the list” (p. 3).  
Additionally, Juran (1954) explains that: 
The vital few must be identified if program of improvement, of planning, or 
control is to succeed.  The trivial many must be identified if there is to be any 
balance between the cost of planning and control vs. the value of planning and 
control...  The importance of the vital few lies in the fact that nothing of 
significance can happen unless it happens to the vital few.  (p. 3) 
Summary 
 LOC-I comprised 70% of all GA fatal accidents between the years 2001-2010.  In 
efforts to reduce the fatality rate in the LOC-I and GA accidents overall, the FAA enlisted 
 
 26 
the help and expertise of the GAJSC.  Upon initial review, the GAJSC chose to focus its 
efforts on the LOC-I accidents occurring during the A&L portion of flight.  
Out of the 276 accidents in the population of GA fatal accidents occurring from 
LOC-I on A&L between 2001-2010, the GAJSC’s study analyzed 30 accidents for 
turbine engine, 30 accidents for reciprocating engine aircraft, and 30 accidents for aircraft 
in the E-AB category (GAJSC, 2012).  When the random samples were established, the 
committee analyzed each of the 90 accidents and categorized the event sequence by 
issuing SPSs.  After all of the accidents had been categorized by SPSs, the GAJSC then 
identified intervention strategies and rated the anticipated effectiveness of each 
intervention strategy.  Therefore, the SPSs provide the foundation on which the GAJSC 
based its findings and recommendations to the FAA.  
Equation 1 details a strict process to use in order to select a sample size that will 
give an accurate representation of the population within a desired level of confidence and 
degree of accuracy.  A combination of using Equation 1 to determine the sample sizes 
needed, as well as using the NTSB probable cause reports, provided the guidelines for 
this study’s development of SPSs.  In addition, the use of a Pareto analysis helped 
identify the top occurrences of probable causes and contributing factors for fatal GA 
accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the outputs (SPS assignments) of a 
sampling process as recommended by Equation 1 using only the NTSB’s probable cause 
reports (NTSB, 2013a). 
Research Approach 
The present study paralleled the GAJSC’s study.  The accident data were 
qualitative in nature from the narratives of the NTSB from each of the accidents.  In a 
manner similar to the GAJSC, this study quantified the qualitative data by categorizing 
each event sequence using the same list of SPSs that was developed by the GAJSC.  
Design and procedures.  For this study, the full accident dataset used by the 
GAJSC was obtained.  The criterion for selection from the NTSB Aviation Accident 
Database and Synopses (NTSB, 2013a) was: 
• General Aviation 
• Accidents that occurred between 2001-2010 
• Primary Cause: Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I) 
• During the Approach and Landing (A&L) phase of flight 
The GAJSC chose to sort its selections further into three categories: reciprocating 
engine aircraft, turbine engine aircraft, and experimental-amateur built aircraft.  This 
study also utilized these three categories.  The researcher then selected random samples 
from each of the three categories using Equation 1.  
Once the random samples had been selected, the researcher and collaborator held 
a training session to analyze non-sampled accidents that had been analyzed by the 
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GAJSC to get into the same mindset as the GAJSC working group.  Once the researcher 
and collaborator had assigned the respective SPSs for the selected training-session 
accidents, the results were informally compared to the GAJSC’s.  This methodology 
acted as a calibration for the researcher and collaborator to link to the approach of the 
GAJSC when assigning SPSs. 
After initial training was completed, the researcher and a collaborator worked 
side-by-side to analyze each accident.  The researcher and collaborator independently 
reviewed each accident and assigned SPSs according to their own interpretation.  
Subsequently, the researcher and collaborator compared their individual SPSs and agreed 
by a consensus on the SPSs for each accident.  
When all accidents were assigned SPSs, the researcher analyzed the data.  SPS 
assignments were examined by total assigned, percentage of occurrence in the accidents, 
and by each category to analyze the results.  The researcher also analyzed separate pairs 
of SPSs to determine if there was a common pair of SPSs that occurred in the accident 
data.  
Population/Sample 
The population of this study was derived from the NTSB Aviation Accident 
Database and Synopses (NTSB, 2013a).  Queries were run to select all GA fatal 
accidents between the years 2001-2010 for the loss of control in-flight, during A&L 
category.  This population resulted in 267 accidents.  These accidents were subdivided, or 
stratified, into aircraft with reciprocal engines (n = 181), aircraft with turbine engines (n 
= 28), and E-AB aircraft (n = 58).  A stratified random sample of each category using 
Equation 1 was generated for this study.  According to Remler and Van Ryzin (2011), “in 
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stratified sampling, a sample is drawn separately from each group” (p. 170).  Therefore, 
this study used Equation 1 to determine the appropriate sample size needed for each 
category: reciprocal engine aircraft, turbine aircraft, and E-AB aircraft. 
Upon examination of the data, 10 accidents were discarded because they lacked 
necessary information, occurred in the wrong phase of flight, or contained misclassified 
data.  In the reciprocal engine aircraft category, four accidents were discarded, which 
brought the final population to 177.  According to Equation 1, a population of 177 
requires a sample size of n = 121.  Replacements were randomly selected.  
In the turbine aircraft category, two accidents were discarded, which brought the 
population for turbine aircraft to n = 26.  According to Equation 1, a population of 26 
requires a sample size of n = 24.  Replacements were randomly selected.  
In the E-AB aircraft category, four accidents were discarded, which brought the 
final population to 54.  According to Equation 1, a population of 54 requires a sample 
size of n = 48.  Replacements were randomly selected. Table 2 summarizes the 
populations and samples.  
 
 
Table 2 
 
Population and Sample Sizes as Determined by Equation 1 
 
 Population 
Original 
Population 
Adjusted Sample Size 
Recip 181 177 121 
Turbine 28 26 24 
E-AB 58 54 48 
Totals 267 257 193 
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The categories’ percentages of the population are depicted in Figure 4.  As shown 
in Figure 4, the category Recip makes up 63% of the population; this causes the data to 
reflect largely only the Recip category when SPSs are studied as a whole. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Depiction of the population stratified into the three categories.  
 
 
 
Sources of the Data 
The accident data that was used for this study was obtained from the NTSB’s 
online Aviation Accident Database and Synopses (NTSB, 2013a).  Only the accidents’ 
probable cause reports were used in this study, as they are made publicly available.  All 
accidents that were analyzed in this study can be found in Appendix B.  
Treatment of the Data  
Descriptive statistics.  The treatment of data included analyzing the most 
frequently occurring SPSs, most frequently occurring pairs of SPSs, and most frequently 
occurring SPSs by each category.  Results were shown in frequency tables to show the 
highest frequency SPS, the number of times that SPS appeared in the accident data, the 
12% 
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Recip
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percentage of that SPS to the total assigned SPSs, as well as the percentage of the SPS by 
the total number of accidents.  
The researcher also sorted the results to show the most frequently occurring SPS 
along with each of the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB).  The results were 
presented in frequency tables to show the highest frequency SPS, the number of times 
that SPS appeared in the accident data, along with the counts of that SPS by category and 
the categories’ percentage of that SPS.  
In addition, the researcher also analyzed the data to determine if specific pairs of 
SPSs were prominent in the dataset.  The results were depicted by a frequency table that 
contained the pair, its frequency of occurrence, and its percentage of occurrence by total 
of accidents.  
Hypothesis testing.  The difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three 
Categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I 
during A&L between 2001-2010 was tested using Chi-square.  The difference in the 
rankings of SPSs among the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA 
accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010 was tested using a 
Friedman’s test followed by a post-hoc Chi-square to locate where the significance was. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
After assigning SPSs to each of the 193 accidents, the researcher analyzed the 
data for SPS assignments by total, SPS assignments by category, as well as the 
occurrence of SPS pairs in the accident dataset.  The results are as follows. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The researcher and collaborator assigned SPSs to each of the 193 accidents.  
There were 784 total SPSs assigned in the dataset.  In Recip, there were 496 assigned 
SPSs; in Turbine, there were 117 assigned SPSs; and in E-AB, there were 171 assigned 
SPSs.  In addition to the three categories, the SPSs also contained specific classifications: 
Pilot, Environmental, Aircraft, ATC, Builder, and Organization.  Table 3 shows the 
classifications of SPS and their occurrences in the dataset.  
 
 
Table 3 
 
Major SPS Classification Totals 
 
 Pilot Environ. Aircraft ATC Builder Org 
Recip (496) 426 (86%) 45 (9%) 22 (4%) 2 (.4%) 0 1 (.2%) 
Turbine (117) 99 (85%) 14 (12%) 4 (3%) 0 0 0 
E-AB (171) 158 (92%) 4 (2%) 7 (4%) 0 2 (1%) 0 
Total (784) 683 (87%) 63 (8%) 33 (4%) 2 (.3%) 2 (.3%) 1 (.1%) 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the SPS assignments were sorted by most frequently occurring SPS.  
Table 4 shows the most frequently occurring SPS along with its total SPS assignments, 
percentage of that SPS by the total SPS assignments (n = 784), and percentage of that 
SPS in the accident dataset (n = 193).  
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Table 4 
 
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs 
 
SPS SPS Description SPS Totals 
% of Assigned 
SPSs (784) 
% of Occurrence 
in Accidents (193) 
18 PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed 141 17.98% 73.06% 
5 PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin 100 12.76% 51.81% 
7 PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making- Poor Judgment  62 7.91% 32.12% 
45 WEATHER - Significant weather (SIGMET) 56 7.14% 29.02% 
4 PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to recognize and execute corrective action 38 4.85% 19.69% 
50 PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach 36 4.59% 18.65% 
52 PILOT - Intentional non-compliance 29 3.70% 15.03% 
22 PILOT - Improper preflight planning 28 3.57% 14.51% 
33 PILOT - Loss of situational awareness 25 3.19% 12.95% 
9 PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft systems and limitations 21 2.68% 10.88% 
1 PILOT - Low pilot time in make and model 19 2.42% 9.84% 
60 PILOT  - Spatial disorientation 19 2.42% 9.84% 
17 AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power 17 2.17% 8.81% 
25 PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured for specific operation 16 2.04% 8.29% 
47 
PILOT - Operated aircraft while under 
influence of unauthorized prescription 
drugs 
15 1.91% 7.77% 
2 PILOT - Recency of experience/proficiency 12 1.53% 6.22% 
3 PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention 12 1.53% 6.22% 
40 PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene 12 1.53% 6.22% 
43 AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained / repaired 12 1.53% 6.22% 
49 PILOT - Improper Go Around 12 1.53% 6.22% 
31 PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs and/or their effects on pilot performance 10 1.28% 5.18% 
14 PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low and/or slow 9 1.15% 4.66% 
20 PILOT - Improper traffic pattern procedures 8 1.02% 4.15% 
36 PILOT - Failure to follow procedure 8 1.02% 4.15% 
Note.  Only those SPSs that are above 1.0% of assigned SPSs are listed in this table.  A 
full table of all SPSs can be found in Appendix A.   
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For the 193 accidents, a total of 784 SPSs were assigned.  Table 5 shows the 
number of accidents in each category along with the number of SPSs that were assigned 
in each category.  
 
 
Table 5 
 
Number of Assigned SPSs by Category 
 
 
# of Accidents in each 
Category 
# of SPSs in each 
Category 
Recip 121 496 
Turbine 24 117 
E-AB 48 171 
Total 193 784 
 
 
 
The most frequently occurring SPSs were also calculated by each category as 
shown in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8.  Tables 6, 7, and 8 follow the same layout and 
show the SPS total by category, followed by the categories’ percentage of each SPS and, 
finally, the percentage of the categories’ SPS in the accident dataset (n = 193). 
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Table  6 
 
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs and Recip Category Totals and Percentages. 
 
Note.  R = Recip = Reciprocating Engine Aircraft.  Acc = Accident.    
SPS # SPS Description Total 
SPSs 
Recip 
SPSs 
% R SPS 
(496) 
% R Acc. 
(121) 
18 PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed   141 85 17.1% 70.2% 
5 PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin  100 64 12.9% 52.9% 
7 
PILOT - Aeronautical Decision 
Making- Poor Judgment   62 44 8.9% 36.4% 
45 
WEATHER - Significant weather 
(SIGMET)  56 41 8.3% 33.9% 
4 
PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to 
recognize and execute corrective action  38 18 3.6% 14.9% 
50 
PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized 
approach  36 21 4.2% 17.4% 
52 PILOT - Intentional non-compliance  29 15 3.0% 12.4% 
22 PILOT - Improper preflight planning  28 20 4.0% 16.5% 
33 PILOT - Loss of situational awareness  25 15 3.0% 12.4% 
9 
PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft 
systems and limitations  21 11 2.2% 9.1% 
1 
PILOT - Low pilot time in make and 
model  19 7 1.4% 5.8% 
60 Pilot - Spatial disorientation  19 17 3.4% 14.0% 
17 AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power  17 12 2.4% 9.9% 
25 
PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured 
for specific operation  16 11 2.2% 9.1% 
47 
PILOT - Operated aircraft while under 
influence of unauthorized prescription 
drugs 
 15 
11 2.2% 9.1% 
2 
PILOT - Recency of 
experience/proficiency  12 10 2.0% 8.3% 
3 PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention  12 8 1.6% 6.6% 
40 
PILOT - Failure of instructor to 
intervene  12 10 2.0% 8.3% 
43 
AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained / 
repaired  12 8 1.6% 6.6% 
49 PILOT - Improper Go Around  12 10 2.0% 8.3% 
31 
PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs 
and/or their effects on pilot performance  10 8 1.6% 6.6% 
14 
PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low 
and/or slow    9 7 1.4% 5.8% 
20 
PILOT - Improper traffic pattern 
procedures    8 2 0.4% 1.7% 
36 PILOT - Failure to follow procedure    8 3 0.6% 2.5% 
 
 36 
Table 7 
 
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs and Turbine Category Totals and Percentages.  
 
SPS # SPS Description Total 
SPSs 
Turbine 
SPSs 
% T SPS 
(117) 
% T Acc. 
(24) 
18 PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed 141 17 14.5% 70.8% 
5 PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin 100 6 5.1% 25.0% 
7 PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making- 
Poor Judgment 
62 8 6.8% 33.3% 
45 WEATHER - Significant weather 
(SIGMET) 
56 11 9.4% 45.8% 
4 PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to 
recognize and execute corrective action 
38 11 9.4% 45.8% 
50 PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach 36 8 6.8% 33.3% 
52 PILOT - Intentional non-compliance 29 4 3.4% 16.7% 
22 PILOT - Improper preflight planning 28 3 2.6% 12.5% 
33 PILOT - Loss of situational awareness 25 7 6.0% 29.2% 
9 PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft 
systems and limitations 
21 3 2.6% 12.5% 
1 PILOT - Low pilot time in make and 
model 
19 1 0.9% 4.2% 
60 Pilot - Spatial disorientation 19 0 0.0% 0.0% 
17 AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power 17 2 1.7% 8.3% 
25 PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured 
for specific operation 
16 3 2.6% 12.5% 
47 PILOT - Operated aircraft while under 
influence of unauthorized prescription 
drugs 
15 3 2.6% 12.5% 
2 PILOT - Recency of 
experience/proficiency 
12 1 0.9% 4.2% 
3 PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention 12 3 2.6% 12.5% 
40 PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene 12 1 0.9% 4.2% 
43 AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained / 
repaired 
12 1 0.9% 4.2% 
49 PILOT - Improper Go Around 12 2 1.7% 8.3% 
31 PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs 
and/or their effects on pilot performance 
10 1 0.9% 4.2% 
14 PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low 
and/or slow 
9 1 0.9% 4.2% 
20 PILOT - Improper traffic pattern 
procedures 
8 3 2.6% 12.5% 
36 PILOT - Failure to follow procedure 8 4 3.4% 16.7% 
Note.  T = Turbine = Turbine Engine Aircraft.  Acc = Accident.  
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Table 8 
 
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs and E-AB Category Totals and Percentages.  
 
SPS # SPS Description Total 
SPSs 
E-AB 
SPSs 
% E-AB  
SPSs (171) 
% E-AB 
Acc. (48) 
18 PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed 141 39 22.8% 81.3% 
5 PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin 100 30 17.5% 62.5% 
7 PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making- 
Poor Judgment  
62 10 5.8% 20.8% 
45 WEATHER - Significant weather 
(SIGMET) 
56 4 2.3% 8.3% 
4 PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to 
recognize and execute corrective action 
38 9 5.3% 18.8% 
50 PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach 36 7 4.1% 14.6% 
52 PILOT - Intentional non-compliance 29 10 5.8% 20.8% 
22 PILOT - Improper preflight planning 28 5 2.9% 10.4% 
33 PILOT - Loss of situational awareness 25 3 1.8% 6.3% 
9 PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft 
systems and limitations 
21 7 4.1% 14.6% 
1 PILOT - Low pilot time in make and 
model 
19 11 6.4% 22.9% 
60 Pilot - Spatial disorientation 19 2 1.2% 4.2% 
17 AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power 17 3 1.8% 6.3% 
25 PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured 
for specific operation 
16 2 1.2% 4.2% 
47 PILOT - Operated aircraft while under 
influence of unauthorized prescription 
drugs 
15 1 0.6% 2.1% 
2 PILOT - Recency of 
experience/proficiency 
12 1 0.6% 2.1% 
3 PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention 12 1 0.6% 2.1% 
40 PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene 12 1 0.6% 2.1% 
43 AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained / 
repaired 
12 3 1.8% 6.3% 
49 PILOT - Improper Go Around 12 0 0.0% 0.0% 
31 PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs 
and/or their effects on pilot performance 
10 1 0.6% 2.1% 
14 PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low 
and/or slow 
9 1 0.6% 2.1% 
20 PILOT - Improper traffic pattern 
procedures 
8 3 1.8% 6.3% 
36 PILOT - Failure to follow procedure 8 1 0.6% 2.1% 
Note. E-AB = Experimental-Amateur Built Aircraft.  Acc = Accident.    
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The researcher also selected the top 10 most frequently occurring SPSs in each category 
as shown in Table 9.  
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Top Ten Most Frequently Occurring SPSs by Category 
Recip SPS Turbine SPS E-AB SPS 
SPS SPS Description  SPS SPS Description  SPS SPS Description 
18 PILOT - Failure to 
maintain airspeed 
18 PILOT - Failure to 
maintain airspeed 
18 PILOT - Failure to 
maintain airspeed 
5 PILOT - Aerodynamic 
Stall/Spin 
 45 WEATHER - 
Significant weather 
(SIGMET) 
 5 PILOT - 
Aerodynamic 
Stall/Spin 
7 PILOT - Aeronautical 
Decision Making- 
Poor Judgment  
 4 PILOT - 
Aerodynamic stall - 
failure to recognize 
and execute corrective 
action 
 1 PILOT - Low pilot 
time in make and 
model 
45 WEATHER - 
Significant weather 
(SIGMET) 
 7 PILOT - Aeronautical 
Decision Making- 
Poor Judgment  
 7 PILOT - 
Aeronautical 
Decision Making- 
Poor Judgment  
50 PILOT - Failure fly a 
stabilized approach 
 50 PILOT - Failure fly a 
stabilized approach 
 52 PILOT - Intentional 
non-compliance 
22 PILOT - Improper 
preflight planning 
 33 PILOT - Loss of 
situational awareness 
 4 PILOT - 
Aerodynamic stall - 
failure to recognize 
and execute 
corrective action 
4 PILOT - Aerodynamic 
stall - failure to 
recognize and execute 
corrective action 
 5 PILOT - 
Aerodynamic 
Stall/Spin 
 50 PILOT - Failure fly 
a stabilized 
approach 
60 Pilot - Spatial 
disorientation 
 52 PILOT - Intentional 
non-compliance 
 9 PILOT - Lack of 
knowledge of 
aircraft systems and 
limitations 
52 PILOT - Intentional 
non-compliance 
 36 PILOT - Failure to 
follow procedure 
 22 PILOT - Improper 
preflight planning 
33 PILOT - Loss of 
situational awareness 
 22 PILOT - Improper 
preflight planning 
 45 WEATHER - 
Significant weather 
(SIGMET) 
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In addition to individual SPS assignments, the researcher also analyzed the dataset to 
determine if any specific pairs of SPSs occurred in the data set.  The researcher found a 
total of 405 unlike pairs which existed in the dataset.  Table 10 shows only the 10 most 
frequently occurring SPS pairs followed by Tables 11, 12, and 13 which show the top 10 
most frequently occurring SPS pairs in each of the three categories.  
 
 
Table 10 
 
Top Ten Most Frequently Occurring SPS Pairs 
 
Pairs of 
SPSs  
Frequency % of Accidents 
(193) 
5,18 99 51.3 
4,18 37 19.2 
18,45 33 17.1 
7,18 33 17.1 
18,50 26 13.5 
7,45 26 13.5 
5,7 24 12.4 
Note.  A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
Table 11 
 
Top Ten Pairs of SPSs within Recip Accidents 
 
Pairs of 
SPSs 
Frequency % of Recip 
Acc. (121) 
5,18 64 52.9 
7,18 23 19.0 
18,45 22 18.2 
7,45 20 16.5 
4,18 18 14.9 
5,7 17 14.0 
18,50 14 11.6 
18,22 13 10.7 
5,45 13 10.7 
Note.  A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 12 
 
Top Ten Pairs of SPSs within Turbine Accidents 
 
Pairs of 
SPSs 
Frequency % of Turbine 
Acc. (24) 
4,18 10 41.7 
18,45 9 37.5 
18,50 6 25.0 
4,45 5 20.8 
5,18 5 20.8 
18,33 4 16.7 
36,52 4 16.7 
45,50 4 16.7 
7,18 4 16.7 
7,45 4 16.7 
Note.  A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
Table 13 
 
Top Ten Pairs of SPSs within E-AB Accidents 
 
Paris of 
SPSs 
Frequency % of E-AB 
Acc. (48) 
5,18 30 62.5 
4,18 9 18.8 
1,18 8 16.7 
1,5 7 14.6 
18,52 7 14.6 
18,50 6 12.5 
5,50 6 12.5 
5,52 6 12.5 
7,18 6 12.5 
5,7 5 10.4 
Note.  A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1.  A Chi-square test was used to test the null hypothesis: There will 
be no difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three Categories (Recip, Turbine, 
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and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 
2001-2010.  The alpha level was set to α = 0.05.  Table 14 displays the results from the 
most frequently occurring SPSs and their respective Chi-square results.  The Chi-square 
test failed to reject the null hypothesis for all of the SPSs, except for SPS 1 (PILOT- Low 
time in make and model) and SPS 5 (PILOT- Stall/Spin), which showed statistically 
significant results.  
 
Table 14 
Chi-Square Results for Hypothesis One 
SPS # R % SPS T % SPS E-AB % SPS X2 Sig. 
18 17.14 14.53 22.81 1.97 0.37 
5 12.90 5.13 17.54 6.64 0.04* 
7 8.87 6.84 5.85 0.66 0.72 
45 8.27 9.40 2.34 4.31 0.12 
4 3.63 9.40 5.26 2.90 0.23 
50 4.23 6.84 4.09 0.94 0.62 
52 3.02 3.42 5.85 1.14 0.57 
22 4.03 2.56 2.92 0.37 0.83 
33 3.02 5.98 1.75 2.62 0.27 
9 2.22 2.56 4.09 0.67 0.71 
1 1.41 0.85 6.43 6.51 0.04* 
60 3.43 0.00 1.17 3.96 0.14 
17 2.42 1.71 1.75 0.16 0.92 
25 2.22 2.56 1.17 0.53 0.77 
47 2.22 2.56 0.58 1.25 0.54 
2 2.02 0.85 0.58 1.04 0.61 
3 1.61 2.56 0.58 1.23 0.54 
40 2.02 0.85 0.58 1.00 0.61 
43 1.61 0.85 1.75 0.33 0.85 
49 2.02 1.71 0.00 1.90 0.39 
31 1.61 0.85 0.58 0.56 0.76 
14 1.41 0.85 0.58 0.37 0.83 
20 0.40 2.56 1.75 1.51 0.47 
36 0.60 3.42 0.58 3.46 0.18 
*p < .05. 
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Hypothesis 2.  A Friedman test was used to examine the null hypothesis: There 
will be no difference in the rankings of SPSs among the three categories (Recip, Turbine, 
and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-
2010.  The results of the Friedman’s test depicted a significant observation.  A post-hoc 
Chi-square was run to pinpoint the data that contained a significant difference.  Table 15 
depicts the results. 
 
Table 15 
Post-hoc Results of Friedman’s Test for Hypothesis 2 
SPS Recip 
Rank 
Turbine 
Rank 
E-AB 
Rank 
X2 Sig. 
18 1 1 1 0.00 1.00 
5 2 7 2 4.56 0.10 
7 3 4 4 0.18 0.91 
45 4 2 10 6.50 0.04* 
4 7 3 6 1.63 0.44 
50 5 5 7 0.47 0.79 
52 10 8 5 1.65 0.44 
22 6 10 9 1.04 0.59 
33 9 6 11 1.46 0.48 
9 12 11 8 0.84 0.66 
1 21 25 3 16.82 0.0002*** 
60 8 33 17 16.59 0.0003*** 
17 11 17 13 1.37 0.51 
25 13 12 16 0.63 0.73 
47 14 13 22 2.98 0.23 
2 15 21 24 2.10 0.35 
3 18 14 23 2.22 0.33 
40 16 22 25 2.00 0.37 
43 20 24 14 2.62 0.27 
49 17 18 36 9.66 0.008** 
31 19 23 26 1.09 0.58 
14 22 26 27 0.56 0.76 
20 28 16 12 7.43 0.02* 
36 26 9 21 8.18 0.02* 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 The data collected in this study allowed the researcher to develop discussion 
points and draw conclusions from the results of the 193 accidents and their assigned 
SPSs.  
Discussion 
 There were several differences between the present study and the GAJSC’s A&L 
study; some of these are shown in Table 16.  Importantly, the sample size of the present 
study (193) was calculated to have a confindence interval of 95% and a margin of error of 
3.5%; the GAJSC WG sample size (90) was found to have a confidence interval of 90% 
and a margin of error of 8.4%.  Though the differences between the two studies prohibit a 
statistical validation of methodologies, the acceptable margin of error should be 
determined a priori.   
 
Table 16 
Comparisons of Present Study and GAJSC A&L Study 
Present Study GAJSC WG 
Larger sample size (193/257) Smaller sample size (90/267) 
Stratified Random Sampling Random Sampling 
Margin of error 3.5% Margin of error 8.4% 
Analyzed probable cause reports Analyzed full accident report 
Used a fully developed list of SPSs Developed list of SPSs as needed 
Did not use duplicate SPSs in an accident Assigned duplicate SPSs in accidents 
Conducted inter-rater calibration sessions Did not formally calibrate raters 
Only analyzed SPSs and their occurrences Developed intervention strategies 
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Descriptive statistics.  This research was able to identify the most frequently occurring 
underlying contributing factors using the Pareto analysis to analyze the probable cause 
reports from the NTSB for 193 fatal GA LOC-I accidents occurring on A&L between 
2001-2010.  The accident dataset analyzed in this study contained 63% reciprocating 
engine aircraft accidents.  When examining the accident data as a whole, it is imperative 
to keep in mind the heavy influence of the Recip category over the other categories, 
Turbine and E-AB. 
 Among the different SPS classifications (Pilot, Environment, Aircraft, ATC, 
Builder, and Organization), the most frequently occurring classification was Pilot (87%), 
which concurs with the literature that approximately 80% of fatal GA accidents are 
attributed to pilot error (Dismukes, 2010). Subsequently, the data was analyzed for the 
highest frequency SPSs.  The data indicated that the most frequently occurring SPS was 
PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed (SPS 18) followed by PILOT – Aerodynamic 
Stall/Spin (SPS 5).  Both SPS 18 and SPS 5 validate the population of the study because 
both are compatible with regard to the main causes of an aircraft in a loss of control 
situation.  Three of the major classifications (Pilot, Environment, and Aircraft) accounted 
for more than 99% of the assigned SPSs. 
Most frequently occurring SPSs.  The analysis of the most frequently occurring 
SPSs within the dataset reveals that a remarkable 73% of the 193 accidents involved SPS 
18 (PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed).  The implications of the high rate of failures to 
maintain airspeed indicate that solving this problem alone could remedy a majority of 
LOC-I accidents during A&L.  Many flight schools, including Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, recognize the benefit of implementing airspeed monitoring/alert 
 
 45 
devices (such as angle of attack indicators) on aircraft for airspeed/stall prevention 
training (K. Byrnes, personal communication, June 25, 2013).  
 The second most frequently occurring SPS in the dataset (52% of accidents) is 
SPS 5 (PILOT – Aerodynamic stall/spin).  Stall/spin accidents are considered an effect of 
the failures to maintain airspeed; therefore, if one can solve the airspeed issue, one can 
also avoid the second most frequent problem. 
 The third most frequently occurring issue in the dataset (32% of accidents) is SPS 
7 (PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making – Poor Judgment).  Aeronautical decision-
making is often addressed by scenario-based training, in which pilots are forced to act 
quickly on vital in-flight decisions (Harris, 1994).  Some of the instances in which SPS 7 
was designated to an accident, involved a chain of poor decisions before the aircraft was 
even started:  
• improper pre-flights (SPS 22) 
• operating while not feeling well (SPS 21) 
• operating while using over-the-counter, unauthorized prescription, or 
illegal drugs (SPS 31, SPS 47, and SPS 19 respectively)  
• significant weather (SPS 45). 
SPS 45: (Weather – Significant weather) is the fourth leading cause (29%) of fatal 
LOC-I during A&L accidents.  The importance of understanding the implications of 
weather and formulating educated in-flight decisions regarding weather must be 
understood on various levels.  In several instances, pilots without Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR) training found themselves in circumstances of deteriorating weather.  Instead of 
choosing an alternate airport, pilots flew into the weather, often lost situational awareness 
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(SPS 33), became spatially disoriented (SPS 60), or attempted to land while on an 
unstabilized approach (SPS 50 and 53).  In certain circumstances, attempting to land from 
an unstabilized approach could be considered intentional non-compliance (SPS 52).  
However, in nearly all of the weather-related cases, some form of poor decision-making 
was exhibited. 
Differences among the most frequently occurring SPSs by category.  Due to 
the large number of Recip accidents in the dataset, it is important to examine the 
differences in most frequently occurring SPSs as they appear in each category; that is, the 
hierarchy of SPS occurrences is not the same across each of the three categories with one 
exception.  The notable exception is that SPS 18 (PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed) 
is the most frequently occurring SPS across all three categories.  The distribution for SPS 
18 in the three categories is Recip = 70.8 %, Turbine = 70.2%, and E-AB = 81.3%.  
 The differences described below are shown in Table 8, while Tables 5-7 show the 
actual percentages.  Subsequently, the researcher observed that Turbine aircraft 
experienced an aerodynamic stall (no spin) more frequently than Recip and E-AB aircraft 
(Turbine = 45%, Recip = 14%, E-AB = 18%).  In addition, Turbine aircraft experienced 
fewer aerodynamic stall/spins than did Recip and E-AB aircraft (Turbine = 25%, Recip = 
52%, E-AB = 62%).  The researcher also observed that SPS 60 (PILOT – Spatial 
disorientation) occurred at a greater rate in Recip accidents (14%) than in Turbine (0%) 
and E-AB (4%) accidents.  
 A few SPSs occurred at higher rates in Turbine accidents than in Recip and E-AB 
accidents.  These include:  
 
 47 
• SPS 50: Unstable approaches (Turbine = 33%, Recip = 12%, and E-AB = 
14%) 
• SPS 60: Loss of situational awareness (Turbine = 29%, Recip = 12%, and 
E-AB = 6%) 
• SPS 36: Failure to follow procedure (Turbine = 17%, Recip = 3%, and  
E-AB = 2%) 
 Other notable differences in highest occurring SPSs across the three categories are 
as follows: 
• SPS 7: PILOT- Aeronautical decision making/poor judgment” occurred at 
nearly the same frequency in Recip and Turbine aircraft (36% and 33%, 
respectively) but only in 20% of E-AB aircraft.   
• SPS 45: Weather occurred at a higher rate in Recip and Turbine aircraft 
(34% and 46%, respectively) compared to only 8% for E-AB aircraft.   
• SPS 22: Improper pre-flights also occurred at a slightly higher rate in 
Recip and Turbine accidents (17% and 16%, respectively) than in E-AB 
accidents (10%).  
• SPS 52: PILOT – Intentional non-compliance occurred at a slightly higher 
frequency in E-AB accidents (20%) than in Recip (12%) and Turbine 
(16%) accidents.   
• E-AB accidents contained more factors relating to aircraft familiarization 
than did accidents occurring in the Recip and Turbine categories.  For 
example, it was observed that E-AB experienced SPS 1 (PILOT – Low 
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pilot time in make and model) in 23% of accidents, yet SPS 1 occurred in 
less than 5% of Recip and Turbine accidents.   
• E-AB accidents experienced SPS 9 (PILOT – Lack of knowledge of 
aircraft systems and limitations) in 14% of accidents compared to Recip 
(9%) and Turbine (12%) accidents. 
 Most frequently occurring pairs of SPSs.  The researcher also analyzed the 
dataset to determine if any specific pairs of SPSs occurred in the dataset.  The data 
showed an outstanding validation that the most frequently occurring pair of SPSs was 
SPS 5 (PILOT - Stall/Spin) and SPS 18 (PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed).  This 
pair was also the highest frequency pair in the Recip and E-AB categories at 53% and 
63%, respectively.  However, in the Turbine category, the most frequently occurring pair 
was SPS 4 (Pilot- Aerodynamic stall) and SPS 18 (PILOT – Failure to maintain 
airspeed).  These findings continue to indicate the need for improvement in maintaining 
airspeed.   
 Hypothesis testing.  The researcher used a Chi-square test to examine Hypothesis 
1 - no difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three Categories (Recip, Turbine, 
and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-
2010.  The results showed that only two of the SPSs (SPS 1 and SPS 5) contained a 
statistically significant difference.  For SPS 1 (PILOT – Low time make/model) the 
results indicate that there are significantly more occurrences of SPS 1 in the E-AB 
category, compared to the other two categories.  This is expected because of the nature of 
E-AB flights; many pilots either construct their own E-AB aircraft (which they have 
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never flown prior) or will purchase an E-AB airplane in which they have little or no 
experience. 
 The researcher tested Hypothesis 2 - no difference in the rankings of SPSs among 
the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from 
LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010.  The analysis revealed there were statistically 
significant differences in the rankings of SPS 45, SPS 1, SPS 60, SPS 20, SPS 49, and 
SPS 36 among the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB).   
Regarding SPS 45 (Weather – Significant weather), the distribution of rankings 
was Recip = 4, Turbine = 2, and E-AB = 10, which conveys that SPS 45 was ranked 
significantly lower in the E-AB category compared to the Recip and Turbine categories.  
This observance is typical since E-AB flights generally take place in Visual Flight Rules 
(VFR) weather. 
 For SPS 1 (PILOT – Low pilot time in make and model), the distribution of 
rankings was Recip = 21, Turbine = 25, and E-AB = 3, which conveys that SPS 1 was 
ranked significantly higher in the E-AB category compared to the Recip and Turbine 
categories.  This observation is expected because most pilots will either build their own 
E-AB aircraft (which they have never flown prior) or will purchase an E-AB airplane, a 
make/model in which they have little or no experience. 
 For SPS 60 (PILOT – Spatial disorientation), the distribution of rankings was 
Recip = 8, Turbine = 33, and E-AB = 17, which conveys that SPS 60 was ranked 
significantly lower in the Turbine category compared to the Recip and E-AB categories.  
This observation concludes that spatial disorientation occurs less frequently in turbine 
LOC-I accidents than in Recip or E-AB LOC-I accidents. 
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For SPS 49 (PILOT – Improper Go Around), the distribution of rankings was 
Recip = 17, Turbine = 18, and E-AB = 36, which conveys that SPS 49 was ranked 
significantly lower in the E-AB category compared to the Recip and Turbine categories. 
For SPS 20 (PILOT – Improper traffic pattern procedures), the distribution of 
rankings was Recip = 28, Turbine = 16, and E-AB = 12, which conveys that SPS 20 was 
ranked significantly lower in the Recip category compared to the Turbine and E-AB 
categories.  
For SPS 36 (PILOT – Failure to follow procedure), the distribution of rankings 
was Recip = 26, Turbine = 9, and E-AB = 21, which conveys that SPS 36 was ranked 
significantly higher in the Turbine category compared to the Recip and E-AB categories. 
Conclusions 
 If the aviation community wishes to take immediate action to reduce LOC-I 
fatalities, the initiative should start with airspeed awareness training.  In all of the 
analyses from this study, it was observed repeatedly, not only in the dataset as a whole, 
but also in each of the three different categories, that pilots’ failure to maintain airspeed is 
the greatest problem.  By solving this one problem alone, 70-80% of all fatal GA LOC-I 
during A&L accidents could be preventable.  Following intervention strategies towards 
failure to maintain airspeed, one should concentrate on other areas for each of the three 
categories: 
• In the Recip category, attention should be focused on aeronautical 
decision-making, proper pre-flight procedures, and spatial disorientation.  
• In the Turbine category, focus should be placed on weather on final 
approach and flying via IFR.  In many of the accidents presented in this 
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study, pilots in Turbine accidents lost situational awareness while in IFR 
conditions, resulting in a failure to recognize the aircraft stalling. 
• In the E-AB category, emphasis should be placed on familiarizing pilots 
with a new aircraft before embarking on any type of flight.  Emphasis 
should also be placed on intentional non-compliance.  
Recommendations 
 Based on the researcher’s experience from this study, several recommendations 
can be provided for further examination.  Primarily, this study demonstrated the 
importance of using standard statistical sampling and analysis methods; in order to be 
defensible, future studies should utilize well-designed and validated research 
methodologies. 
 Should additional research be conducted using the methodology from this study, 
the researchers should consider validity and reliability of the list of SPSs developed by 
the GAJSC.  An exhaustive literature review will prove beneficial to building a 
comprehensive list of SPSs.  If the list of SPSs used in this study is continued, it should 
be updated to reduce duplicate statements (e.g., SPS 50: “PILOT – Failure to fly a 
stabilized approach” and SPS 53: “PILOT – Unstabilized approach”).  In this study, the 
researcher sometimes could not identify an SPS that accurately represented a situation.  
Further development of the SPS list (Appendix A) will provide a strong foundation for 
analyzing accidents.  Additionally, should the list of SPSs be updated, the previous 
study/ies should be re-evaluated to reflect the updated list. 
 When examining the GAJSC study, the researcher noticed SPSs recorded multiple 
times in a given accident.  The repeated occurrence of duplicate SPSs in accidents should 
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be questioned in regard to proper statistical methodology.  A more robust methodology 
should be developed for issuance of SPSs to include interrater-reliability testing.  The 
methodology should include detailed instructions about when and when not to assign an 
SPS to an accident as well as a training session to ensure that the researcher(s) is(are) 
properly calibrated to the methodology.  Building a stronger statistical framework will 
strengthen the findings and conclusions of future studies.  
 This study analyzed only the probable cause reports of the accidents.  An analysis 
of the probable cause reports proved to be beneficial in saving resources, thus allowing 
the researcher to review an adequate sample size. If further research were done, it would 
be helpful to determine if any insight can be gained from analyzing the entire accident 
docket compared to analyzing only the probable cause reports. 
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Standard Problem Statements 
  
1 PILOT - Low pilot time in make and model 
2 PILOT - Recency of experience/proficiency 
3 PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention 
4 PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to recognize and execute corrective action 
5 PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin 
6 
AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM - Failure of air traffic control to provide instructions/information/ 
clearances using standard and unambiguous phraseology in accordance with appropriate 
regulatory directives.  
7 PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making- Poor Judgment  
8 
AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM – Air traffic system procedures that may compromise safety or 
increase flight crew workload (e.g. noise abatement procedures, slam dunk approaches, 
inappropriate taxi routes during low visibility operations, etc.). 
9 PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft systems and limitations 
10 PILOT - Lateral imbalance 
11 PILOT - Failure to acknowledge traffic and maintain separation. 
12 PILOT - Different types of operations in close proximity 
13 PILOT - Failure of third party to voice concerns 
14 PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low and/or slow 
15 PILOT - Wake turbulence 
16 PILOT - Flight testing at low altitude 
17 AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power 
18 PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed 
19 PILOT - Operated aircraft while under influence of illegal drugs  
20 PILOT - Improper traffic pattern procedures 
21 PILOT - Not feeling well 
22 PILOT - Improper preflight planning 
23 PILOT - Recency of night experience 
24 PILOT - Lack of aeronautical knowledge 
25 PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured for specific operation 
26 PILOT - Inadequate/missing transition training 
27 WEATHER SERVICE - Inaccurate forecast 
28 ENVIRONMENTAL - Weather deterioration 
29 PILOT - Overload 
30 PILOT - Lack of assertiveness/command with ATC 
31 PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs and/or their effects on pilot performance 
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32 PILOT - Lack of piloting ability 
33 PILOT - Loss of situational awareness 
34 PILOT - Failure to verify information 
35 PILOT - Inadequate/improper training 
36 PILOT - Failure to follow procedure 
37 AIRCRAFT - Powerplant control malfunction 
38 PILOT - Fatigue 
39 PILOT - Poor safety culture 
40 PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene 
41 AIRCRAFT - System component failure - non powerplant 
42 PILOT - Failure to test/inspect aircraft after maintenance  
43 AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained / repaired 
44 PILOT - Lack of CRM 
45 WEATHER - Significant weather (SIGMET) 
46 INFRASTRUCTURE/NAVAID - Out of service and/or malfunctioning 
47 PILOT - Operated aircraft while under influence of unauthorized prescription drugs 
48 PILOT - Low pilot time in complex / high performance 
49 PILOT - Improper Go Around 
50 PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach 
51 PILOT - runway incursion 
52 PILOT - Intentional non-compliance 
53 PILOT - Unstabilized approach 
54 AIRCAFT - Unsafe flying characteristics 
55 PILOT - Attention Allocation 
56 AIRCRAFT - No Stall Warning System installed 
57 ORGANIZATION - No or poor safety culture 
58 FAA - ASI lack of knowledge of type of aircraft and certification requirements 
59 BUILDER- Lack of knowledge of aircraft systems and limitations 
60 Pilot - Spatial disorientation 
61 PILOT - Failed to monitor fuel level 
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Appendix B 
Accident Set Reviewed by Researcher and Collaborator 
Tables 
B1 Recip Category Accident Set 
B2 Turbine Category Accident Set 
B3 E-AB Category Accident Set 
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Table B1 
 
Recip Category Accident Set 
 
NTSB AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL CITY, STATE 
DFW07FA036 CESSNA 310Q WACO, TX 
CHI06FA186 CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. SR-22 EDGEWATER, MD 
CHI05FA103 CESSNA 150M FESTUS, MO 
CHI02FA009 BEECH 58 DUBUQUE, IA 
SEA08FA036 CESSNA 177 AUBURN, CA 
ATL01FA036 CESSNA 421 MUNFORD, AL 
NYC03FA203 CESSNA 402C NANTUCKET, MA 
NYC01FA223 PIPER PA-31-350 BERN TOWNSHIP, PA 
NYC03FA024 SOCATA TB-20 MASSENA, NY 
NYC04FA170 PIPER PA-32R-301T WHEELING, WV 
LAX02FA061 CESSNA T337H BUENA PARK, CA 
ANC04FA021 BEECH J35 PENSACOLA, FL 
LAX08FA092 BEECH 95-B55 BENSON, AZ 
DFW06FA136 CESSNA 150F LEVELLAND, TX 
CHI05FA199 GLASAIR GS-2 WAUTOMA, WI 
MIA04FA047 PIPER PA-23-160 LAKE WORTH, FL 
CHI05FA260 PIPER PA-32-300 WABASH, IN 
IAD01FA038 PIPER PA-28-RT201 MANASSAS, VA 
NYC03FA022 CESSNA 182D NEW PHILADELPHIA, OH 
MIA06FA069 CESSNA 340A MELBOURNE, FL 
FTW02FA113 BEECH D-45 MINDEN, LA 
LAX04FA162 MOONEY M20K LOS ANGELES, CA 
FTW03FA037 CESSNA 152 JUSTIN, TX 
IAD05LA126 CESSNA 172H CORRY, PA 
CHI07FA084 BEECH 58 MUNSTER, IN 
LAX06FA126 CESSNA 414A KAHULUI, HI 
MIA02FA170 BEAGLE AIRCRAFT B-206 SERIES 2 MCALPIN, FL 
NYC07FA159 MOONEY M20F BROOKS, KY 
FTW04FA045 CESSNA 172K GRAND SALINE, TX 
MIA08FA091 AEROFAB LAKE LA-250 SKANEATELES, NY 
CHI06FA076 CESSNA 421B WHEELING, IL 
LAX05FA262 PIPER PA-28-235 BIG BEAR CITY, CA 
FTW03FA051 PIPER PA-34-220T MCALESTER, OK 
SEA07FA031 PIPER PA-28-140 BANDON, OR 
DEN07FA059 BEECH H-18 GREAT BEND, KS 
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NYC01FA169 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-1C MEDFORD, NJ 
IAD03FA053 BEECH 24R WAUSEON, OH 
FTW02FA071 BEECH C23 SINTON, TX 
DFW06LA041 BOEING A75N1 (PT17) FORT WORTH, TX 
MIA02FA045 PIPER PA-32-260 JACKSONVILLE, FL 
CHI08FA053 BEECH V35B SPRINGFIELD, IL 
FTW04FA038 PIPER PA-28-140 LIVINGSTON, TX 
CHI01FA093 CESSNA 172H CENTRALIA, IL 
MIA05FA045 PIPER PA-28-140 LEESBURG, FL 
DEN03FA040 BEECH V35B ROCK SPRINGS, WY 
IAD02FA037 CESSNA 172P OCEAN CITY, MD 
NYC08FA046 CESSNA 310R OWENSBORO, KY 
SEA08FA013 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-5A SEQUIM, WA 
ATL06FA122 PIPER PA-32RT-300 HARTSVILLE, SC 
DEN02FA034 CESSNA 340 ENGLEWOOD, CO 
LAX06FA089 PIPER PA-30 VISALIA, CA 
ATL04FA079 CESSNA 210 BLOUNTVILLE, TN 
NYC03LA054 CESSNA 182P SO. CHARLESTON, WV 
SEA03FA042 PIPER PA-34-220T REXBURG, ID 
SEA04FA031 PIPER PA-44-180 CAVE JUNCTION, OR 
CHI06FA154 PIPER PA-32R-301T PARKVILLE, MO 
CHI07FA046 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 114 JASPER, TN 
DFW05FA251 CESSNA 150M CRYSTAL SPRINGS, MS 
CHI04FA255 CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. SR-22 PARK FALLS, WI 
LAX05FA193 MOONEY M20C VAN NUYS, CA 
CHI06FA032 AERO COMMANDER 500B GAYLORD, MI 
DEN06FA111 PIPER PA-28R-201 SALIDA, CO 
FTW01FA117 CONVAIR BT-13A ODESSA, TX 
LAX05FA079 CESSNA 180 ADELANTO, CA 
DFW05FA152 BEECH 76 CONROE, TX 
LAX04FA241 CESSNA 337 CARSON CITY, NV 
NYC07FA100 PIPER PA-23-250 WINDHAM, CT 
MIA08FA081 CIRRUS SR22 WAXHAW, NC 
CHI08FA061 CESSNA 340 PORT CLINTON, OH 
NYC03FA079 RAYTHEON V35A DELAWARE CITY, DE 
CHI07FA073 CESSNA 340A COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA 
ATL06FA102 PIPER PA-32-260 SUCHES, GA 
ATL02FA171 MOONEY M20R BURNSVILLE, NC 
CHI01FA206 BEECH E-55 CARTERVILLE, MO 
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LAX07LA130 BEECH 35-B33 SEDONA, AZ 
DFW08FA228 AMERICAN CHAMPION (ACAC) 7GCBC WICHITA FALLS, TX 
DFW07FA042 CESSNA T210N AUSTIN, TX 
NYC07LA098 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-5B DANVILLE, VA 
DFW06FA180 BEECH C24R VIRGINIA BEACH, VA 
ANC02FA097 PIPER PA-18 SKWENTNA, AK 
LAX03FA078 BEECH D95A LANCASTER, CA 
NYC07LA210 CESSNA 150J HAZLETON, PA 
LAX05LA286 CESSNA 172 YUMA, AZ 
CHI02FA042 MOONEY M20M EVANSVILLE, IN 
MIA08FA021 MOONEY M20J FORT MYERS, FL 
ATL02FA063 PIPER PA-28-160 LAURENS, SC 
FTW03FA225 CESSNA 310J NEW ORLEANS, LA 
MIA01FA151 MOONEY M-20J MONROE, NC 
LAX03LA270 BEECH K35 GERLACH, NV 
CHI04FA257 CESSNA 182T CHESTERFIELD, MO 
ANC08FA079 PIPER PA-18 WASILLA, AK 
CHI08FA196 CZECH AIRCRAFT WORKS SPORT CRUISER NEWARK, IL 
ANC05FA030 BEECH K35 LEESBURG, FL 
LAX01LA303 CESSNA P206B WILLITS, CA 
CHI04FA133 CESSNA U206F OWATONNA, MN 
DFW05LA118 CESSNA TR182 LITTLE ROCK, AR 
DFW06FA021 PIPER PA-34-220T TOMBALL, TX 
CHI02FA120 CESSNA 182S SHEBOYGAN, WI 
NYC07FA145 CESSNA 182C HIDDENITE, NC 
NYC01FA212 PITTS S-2B SHIRLEY, NY 
LAX03FA111 BEECH 3NM ANZA, CA 
SEA04FA173 BEECH C35 KALISPELL, MT 
ATL07FA010 CESSNA 182T ROCKY MOUNT, NC 
SEA06FA007 PIPER PA-28-140 EVERETT, WA 
SEA05FA034 CESSNA 182R MONROE, LA 
CHI08FA039 CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. SR22 FARIBAULT, MN 
DFW05FA178 PIPER PA-34-220T NORMAN, OK 
SEA05FA125 CESSNA 172M YAMHILL, OR 
NYC01FA109 BEECH A-36 MIDDLETOWN, RI 
CHI08FA055 CESSNA 310R TRAVERSE CITY, MI 
ANC05FA098 MAULE M-7-235 SEWARD, AK 
FTW01FA104 CESSNA 402B DEL RIO, TX 
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IAD03FA045 BEECH A36 POMONA, NJ 
SEA07FA195 YAKOVLEV YAK-55M EVERETT, WA 
ANC07FA054 CESSNA 177RG WASILLA, AK 
FTW04FA083 TAYLORCRAFT BC12-D WRIGHTSVILLE, AR 
FTW04FA037 PIPER PA-28-181 SUGAR LAND, TX 
NYC01FA189 PIPER PA-46-350 WESTFIELD, MA 
NYC03FA205 CESSNA 182T CONCORD, MA 
NYC06FA209 CESSNA 401A WHICK, KY 
NYC04FA127 MOONEY M20J OXFORD, CT 
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Table B2 
 
Turbine Category Accident Set 
 
NTSB AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL CITY, STATE 
NYC05FA042 EMBRAER EMB-110P1 SWANZEY, NH 
DEN05FA051 BEECH BE-90 RAWLINS, WY 
IAD03FA043 BEECHCRAFT B200 LEOMINSTER, MA 
FTW03FA036 ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES 1124A TAOS, NM 
MIA08FA141 SOCATA TBM700 KENNESAW, GA 
ATL06FA044 BEECH 200 N MYRTLE BEACH, SC 
NYC03FA080 DASSAULT AVIATION DA-20 SWANTON, OH 
LAX04FA165 MITSUBISHI MU-2B-40 NAPA, CA 
NYC06LA160 AERIAL PRODUCTIONS INTL. INC. ACROJET SPECIAL OCEAN CITY, MD 
DFW08FA057 PIPER PA46-500TP SAN ANTONIO, TX 
DEN03FA045 PIPER PA-46-500TP ALBUQUERQUE, NM 
IAD03FA035 SOCATA TBM 700 LEESBURG, VA 
IAD04FA021 MITSUBISHI MU-2B-60 FERNDALE, MD 
ANC07FA073 PIPER PA-46-350P SITKA, AK 
IAD05FA047 PILATUS PC-12/45 BELLEFONTE, PA 
SEA05FA025 CESSNA 208B BELLEVUE, ID 
DEN01FA094 CESSNA 208B STEAMBOAT SPRINGS, CO 
SEA06FA022 CESSNA 425 BELGRADE, MT 
MIA02FA037 CESSNA 208B BESSEMER, AL 
LAX06FA071 LEARJET 35A TRUCKEE, CA 
DFW05FA170 BEECH E90 NEW ROADS, LA 
NYC07FA065 SOCATA TBM 700 DARTMOUTH, MA 
LAX07FA150 CESSNA S550 DILLON, MT 
LAX07FA059 PIPER PA-46-350P CONCORD, CA 
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Table B3 
 
E-AB Category Accident Set 
 
NTSB AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL CITY, STATE 
DFW07LA032 NOBLE VANS RV-7A NORMAN, OK 
NYC08LA225 RANS, INC. RANS S-6ES LAJAS, PR 
CHI01LA138 BRAULT GLASAIR SH2F GREEN BAY, WI 
MIA08FA052 KAYLOR J E/STRAHLMANN R L RV-4 ELKIN, NC 
IAD05LA039 AIR CREATION CLIPPER 912 WOODBINE, NJ 
ATL02LA099 AERO PARTNERS ONE LLC CA 7SL MERRITT ISLAND, FL 
IAD02LA089 PUHL GENESIS PETERSBURG, WV 
CHI07LA150 WOOD VANS RV7A MARYSVILLE, OH 
SEA08LA178 KOLB MARK III RICHLAND, WA 
CHI07LA113 MURPHY AIRCRAFT MFG, LTD. SR3500 MOOSE COTTER, AR 
LAX03LA192 ARGUS AVIATION CA-7 ANGLETON, TX 
ATL07LA073 CULVER, AURTHER L. SEAWIND 3000 YANCEYVILLE, NC 
DFW07LA090 SCHILLECI RV-6 SINTON, TX 
CHI08FA224 MOSER GEORG LANCAIR LEGACY FG OSHKOSH, WI 
SEA06LA134 TAYLOR ROYAL T DAVENPORT, WA 
NYC05LA012 DOUGLAS ADVENTURE AIR AMPIB PAWTUCKET, RI 
FTW04LA040 HACKNEY VANS RV-6A CARTHAGE, TX 
LAX06LA170 SCHLITTER RANS S-18 STINGER LLANO, CA 
ATL04LA001 JOHNSON WALTER A HORNET SAINT MARY’S, GA 
CHI01FA235 PAYNE GILES G-202 OSHKOSH, WI 
LAX04LA106 COX THORPE T-18 COMPTON, CA 
CHI03LA013 WONDRASEK RANS S-10 SAKOTA MISSOURI VALLEY, IA 
CHI08LA123 DICKENSON BATHTUB BROADHEAD, WI 
CHI05LA030 HEDGE BEDE-4 OMAHA, NE 
SEA03FA041 GRUBERT KIS TRI-R TR-1 PUYALLUP, WA 
ATL05LA078 EARNEST JODEL D-9 MEMPHIS, TN 
DFW07FA023 MCCUTCHAN GLASAIR MINERAL WELLS, TX 
CHI04LA026 MASTER DONALD C BD5B TRAVERSE CITY, MI 
DFW05LA102 SPEARMAN RAPTOR BOGALUSA, LA 
LAX02LA109 TRENTI RV-4 JACUMBA, CA 
MIA03LA045 BORNHOFEN TWINJET 1500 MELBOURNE, FL 
DEN07LA108 SCHWARZ RV-6A GREELEY, CO 
ATL04LA064 ATKINSON SA 102.5 TRENTON, SC 
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SEA08LA145 POULIN L/CULLEN D LANCAIR LEGACY MURRIETA, CA 
ATL04LA166 SIDNEY FREEBIRD LEXINGTON, TN 
ATL04LA158 PITTS S-1 DURHAM, NC 
CHI06FA196 SHAW EUROPA XS OSHKOSH, WI 
SEA03LA118 HERRIN HORNET NEWBERG, OR 
MIA01LA170 UNKNOWN DRAGONFLY B LABELLE, FL 
LAX07LA175 SKYGEAR SKYGEAR CHINO, CA 
NYC08FA157 CARTWRIGHT H JR/COTTRELL M RV-10 SEALE, AL 
LAX05LA069 SLIPSTREAM REVELATION CAMARILLO, CA 
DEN01FA082 SANDELL ZENITH CH 200 CANON CITY, CO 
DEN03FA111 HAMMOND VANS RV-6A LA JUNTA, CO 
CHI01FA244 SCHUCHART STODDARD HAMILTONSH3 OSHKOSH, WI 
SEA06FA116 LCIV LLC LANCAIR IV-P PROPJET PROVO, UT 
IAD02LA028 WILBURN JODEL F-12 CLARKSVILLE, VA 
NYC08LA001 LAMBERT JOHN G VARIEZE CHESAPEAKE, VA 
 
 
